Exavolt Chain (Chain ID 188188) — Official Audit Report
A full pre-mainnet smart contract audit was conducted across all 5 official Exavolt contracts using two independent static analysis tools: Slither v0.11.5 (Trail of Bits) and Mythril v0.24.8 (ConsenSys). The audit was performed on VPS 5 (isolated from the hidden validator node) against the exact source files deployed on-chain.
Mythril found zero exploitable vulnerabilities across all contracts. Slither produced 73 findings, all of which were reviewed and classified as either false positives or intentional DEX architecture patterns consistent with Uniswap V2 design. Three low-priority architectural recommendations were identified, acted upon, and all 5 contracts were patched, redeployed, and re-verified on the block explorer before mainnet.
| Contract | Version | Verified | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| ExavoltMultiSig | v1.2.0 | explorer.exavolt.io ↗ | ✓ Fixed & Redeployed |
| ExavoltUSDT | v3 | explorer.exavolt.io ↗ | ✓ Verified |
| ExavoltRegistry | v1.3.0 | explorer.exavolt.io ↗ | ✓ Fixed & Redeployed |
| ExavoltSwapFactory | v3 | explorer.exavolt.io ↗ | ✓ Fixed & Redeployed |
| ExavoltSwapRouter | v8 | explorer.exavolt.io ↗ | ✓ Verified |
⚠️ Always verify current contract addresses via the ExavoltRegistry on-chain or at explorer.exavolt.io. The Registry is the single source of truth. Deprecated deployments are not in scope for the bug bounty.
Mythril performs symbolic execution and taint analysis to detect exploitable vulnerabilities including reentrancy, integer overflow/underflow, unprotected selfdestruct, and arbitrary storage writes. All 5 contracts were analyzed independently.
| Contract | Issues Found | Exploitable |
|---|---|---|
| ExavoltMultiSig | 0 | None |
| ExavoltUSDT v3 | 0 | None |
| ExavoltRegistry | 0 | None |
| ExavoltSwapFactory + Pair | 0 | None |
| ExavoltSwapRouter | 0 | None |
Result: Zero exploitable vulnerabilities detected across all contracts.
Slither performs static analysis across a broad set of detectors covering reentrancy, access control, arithmetic issues, and code quality. 73 findings were produced across all contracts. Each finding was manually reviewed and classified.
| Category | Count | Classification |
|---|---|---|
| Reentrancy warnings (DEX swap/liquidity flows) | 28 | False Positive — intentional DEX pattern |
| Low-level call usage | 14 | False Positive — required for EVM compatibility |
| Missing zero-address checks | 3 | Low — fixed in redeployment |
| Event not emitted on state change | 1 | Low — fixed (OwnershipTransferred event added) |
| executed flag not reset on failure | 1 | Low — fixed in MultiSig _execute() |
| Tautology / code quality | 11 | False Positive — informational only |
| Unused return values | 9 | False Positive — intentional Uniswap V2 pattern |
| Naming convention | 6 | False Positive — style only, no security impact |
| Other informational | 0 | — |
In ExavoltMultiSig, a failed execution did not reset the executed flag, potentially allowing replay under edge conditions. Fixed by adding proper failure path reset in _execute(). Contract redeployed as v1.2.0.
ExavoltRegistry did not emit an event on ownership transfer, reducing on-chain transparency. Fixed by adding the OwnershipTransferred event. Contract redeployed as v1.3.0.
ExavoltSwapFactory v2 lacked a zero-address guard in setFeeToSetter(), risking accidental permanent loss of fee control. Fixed with explicit zero-address check. Contract redeployed as v3.
All three fixes required redeployment of 5 contracts total due to cascading immutable constructor dependencies (Factory address is immutable in Router; MultiSig address is immutable in Registry; USDT bridgeController is immutable). The ExavoltSwapPair contract was additionally reborn automatically via CREATE2 with a new address because the Factory address changed. All contracts re-verified on-chain post-deployment.
| Layer | Method | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Layer 1 | Static analysis — Slither v0.11.5 + Mythril v0.24.8 | ✓ Complete |
| Layer 2 | Community Bug Bounty Program (EXVT rewards) | Launching at mainnet |
Exavolt treats security as a continuous process, not a one-time event. The community bug bounty program (Audit Layer 2) launches simultaneously with the public mainnet announcement — transforming the entire community into a permanent, incentivized security review layer that never sleeps.
All contracts are verified on explorer.exavolt.io and source code is publicly readable. No privileged withdrawal functions exist in any contract. Every administrative action requires 2-of-3 MultiSig confirmation, verifiable on-chain.